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Abstract: The paper is devoted to construction of solutions in dynamic bimatrix games.
In the model, the payoffs are presented by discounted integrals on the infinite time horizon.
The dynamics of the game is subject to the system of the A.N. Kolmogorov type differential
equations. The problem of construction of equilibrium trajectories is analyzed in the framework
of the minimax approach proposed by N.N. Krasovskii and A. I. Subbotin in the differential
games theory. The concept of dynamic Nash equilibrium developed by A. F. Kleimenov is applied
to design the structure of the game solution. For obtaining constructive control strategies of
players, the maximum principle of L. S. Pontryagin is used in conjunction with the generalized
method of characteristics for Hamilton–Jacobi equations. The impact of the discount index is
indicated for equilibrium strategies of the game and demand functions in the dynamic bimatrix
game are constructed.
Keywords: Optimal control, differential games, guaranteed strategies, equilibrium trajectories,
demand functions.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider the dynamic bimatrix game with discounted
integral payoff functionals on the infinite horizon. Usu-
ally the discount parameter appears to be very uncertain
value which reflects subjective components in economic
and financial models. In this case, models with discounted
indices require an implementation of sensitivity analysis
for solutions with respect to changing of the discount
parameter. In the paper, optimal control strategies are
designed on the basis of the Krasovskii minimax approach
(see Krasovskii and Krasovskii (1995); Krasovskii and
Subbotin (1988)), using constructions of the Pontryagin
maximum principle (see Pontryagin et al. (1962)) and
the Subbotin technique of the method of characteristics
for generalized (minimax) solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi
equations (see Subbotin (1991); Subbotin and Tarasyev
(1985)). Basing on constructed optimal control strategies,
equilibrium trajectories for dynamic bimatrix game are
simulated in the framework of the approach proposed by
A. F. Kleimenov (see Kleimenov (1993)). It is important
to note that in the considered statement we can obtain
analytical solutions for control strategies depending ex-
plicitly on an uncertain discount parameter. That allows
to implement the sensitivity analysis for equilibrium tra-
jectories with respect to changes of the discount parameter
and determine the asymptotic behavior of solutions when
the discount parameter converges to zero. We show that
control strategies and equilibrium solutions asymptotically
converge to the solution of the dynamic bimatrix game
with the average integral payoff functional considered in
papers by V. I. Arnold (see Arnold (2002)).
 The paper is supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic
Research (Project No. 18-01-00264a).
Let us note that we use dynamic constructions and meth-
ods of evolutionary games analysis proposed in the paper
(see Kryazhimskii and Osipov (1995)). To explain the dy-
namics of players’ interaction we use elements of evolution-
ary games (see Basar and Olsder (1982); Vorobyev (1985)).
For the analysis of shifting equilibrium trajectories from a
competitive static Nash equilibrium to points of the coop-
erative Pareto maximum we consider ideas and construc-
tions of cooperative dynamic games (see Petrosjan and
Zenkevich (2015)). The dynamics of the bimatrix game can
be interpreted as a generalization of Kolmogorov’s equa-
tions for probabilities of states (see Kolmogorov (1938)),
which are widely used in Markov processes, stochastic
models of mathematical economics and queuing theory.
The solution of dynamic bimatrix games is based on con-
struction of positional strategies that maximize own pay-
offs, which means “guaranteeing” strategies (see Krasovskii
and Krasovskii (1995); Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988);
Kurzhanskii (1977)). Elements of the Pontryagin maxi-
mum principle (see Pontryagin et al. (1962)) are considered
in the aggregation with the method of characteristics for
Hamilton-Jacobi equations (see Krasovskii and Taras’ev
(2007); Subbotin (1991)). The optimal trajectory in each
time interval is constructed from pieces of characteristics
while switching moments from one characteristic to an-
other are determined by the maximum principle. Let us
note that analogous methods for construction of positional
strategies are used in papers (see Klaassen et al. (2004);
Krasovskii and Tarasyev (2015, 2016)).
In the framework of proposed approach we consider the
model of competition on financial markets which is de-
scribed by dynamic bimatrix game. For this game we con-
struct switching curves for optimal control strategies and
synthesize equilibrium trajectories for various values of
the discount parameter. Results of the sensitivity analysis
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are demonstrated for the obtained solutions. This analysis
shows that switching curves of optimal control strategies
for the series of the discount parameter values have the
convergence property by the parameter. We construct de-
mand functions and provide qualitative analysis for trends
of demand curves.
2. DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL
The system of differential equations which defines the
dynamics of behavior for two players is investigated
ẋ(t) = −x(t) + u(t), x(t0) = x0,
ẏ(t) = −y(t) + v(t), y(t0) = y0. (1)
The parameter x = x(t), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, means the probability
that first player holds to the first strategy (respectively,
(1 − x) is the probability that he holds to the second
strategy). The parameter y = y(t), 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, is the
probability of choosing the first strategy by the second
player (respectively, (1−y) is the probability that he holds
to the second strategy). Control parameters u = u(t) and
v = v(t) satisfy conditions 0 ≤ u ≤ 1, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, and
can be interpreted as signals, that recommend change of
strategies by players. For example, value u = 0 (v = 0)
corresponds to the signal: “change the first strategy to the
second one”. The value u = 1 (v = 1) corresponds to the
signal: “change the second strategy to the first one”. The
value u = x (v = y) corresponds to the signal: “keep the
previous strategy”.
It is worth to note, that the basis for the dynamics (1)
and its properties were examined in papers (see Kryazhim-
skii and Osipov (1995)). This dynamics generalizes Kol-
mogorov’s differential equations for probabilities of states
(see Kolmogorov (1938)). Such generalization assumes
that coefficients of incoming and outgoing streams inside
coalitions of players are not fixed a priori and can be con-
structed as positional strategies in the controlled process.
3. LOCAL PAYOFF FUNCTIONS
Let us assume that the payoff of the first player is described
my the matrix A = aij , and the payoff of the second player












Local payoff functions of the players in the time period
t, t ∈ [t0,+∞) are determined by the mathematical
expectation of payoffs, given by corresponding matrices
A and B in the bimatrix game, and can be interpreted as
“local” interests of the players
gA(x(t), y(t)) = CAx(t)y(t)− α1x(t)− α2y(t) + a22,
Here parameters CA, α1, α2 are determined according
to the classical theory of bimatrix games (see Vorobyev
(1985))
CA = a11 − a12 − a21 + a22, DA = a11a22 − a12a21,
α1 = a22 − a12, α2 = a22 − a21,
Payoff gB and parameters CB , β1, β2 are determined
analogously.
4. DYNAMIC NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we consider the non-zero sum differential

















defined on the trajectories (x(·), y(·)) of the system (1).





are determined analogously by replacement of the function
gA(x, y) by the function gB(x, y).
Let us introduce the notion of dynamic Nash equilibrium
for the evolutionary game with the dynamics (1) and
discounted payoff functionals (2) in the context of con-
structions of non-antagonistic positional differential games
(see Kleimenov (1993); Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988);
Kryazhimskii and Osipov (1995)). Let us define the dy-
namic Nash equilibrium in the class of positional strategies
(feedbacks) U = u(t, x, y, ε), V = v(t, x, y, ε).
Definition 1. The dynamic Nash equilibria (U0, V 0), U0 =
u0(t, x, y, ε), V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε) from the class of controls
by the feedback principle U = u(t, x, y, ε), V = v(t, x, y, ε)
for the given problem is determined by inequalities
JD−A(x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ JD+A(x1(·), y1(·))− ε,
JD−B(x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ JD+B(x2(·), y2(·))− ε,
(x0(·), y0(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U0, V 0),
(x1(·), y1(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U, V 0),
(x2(·), y2(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U0, V ).
Here symbol X stands for the set of trajectories, starting
from initial point and generated by corresponding pos-
tional strategies is the sense of the paper (see Krasovskii
and Subbotin (1988)).
5. AUXILIARY ZERO-SUM GAMES
For the construction of desired equilibrium feedbacks U0,
V 0 we use the approach (see Kleimenov (1993)). In ac-
cordance with this approach we construct the equilibrium
using optimal feedbacks for differential games ΓA = Γ
−
A ∪









the gamed ΓA the first player maximizes the functional
JD−A(x(·), y(·)) with the guarantee using the feedback
U = u(t, x, y, ε), and the second player oppositely provides
the minimization of the functional JD+A(x(·), y(·)) using
the feedback V = v(t, x, y, ε). Vice versa, in the game ΓB
the second player maximizes the functional JD−B(x(·), y(·))
with the guarantee, and the first player maximizes the
functional JD+B(x(·), y(·)).
Let us introduce following notations. By u0A = u
0
A(t, x, y, ε)
and v0B = v
0
B(t, x, y, ε) we denote feedbacks that solve the
problem of guaranteed maximization for payoff functionals
JD−A and JD
−
B respectively. Let us note, that these feed-
backs represent the guaranteed maximization of players’
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payoffs in the long run and can be named “positive”.
By u0B = u
0




A(t, x, y, ε) we denote
feedbacks mostly favorable for opposite players, namely,
those, that minimize payoff functionals JD+B , JD
+
A of the
opposite players. Let us call them “punishing”.
Let us note, that inflexible solutions of selected problems
can be obtained in the framework of the classical bimatrix
games theory. Let us propose for definiteness, (this propo-
sition is given for illustration without loss of generality for
the solution), that the following relations corresponding to
the almost antagonistic structure of bimatrix game hold
for the parameters of matrices A and B, CA > 0, CB < 0,
0 < xA = α2/CA < 1, 0 < xB = β2/CB < 1,
0 < yA = α1/CA < 1, 0 < yB = β1/CB < 1.
The following proposition is valid.







have equal values w−A = w
+





wB = DB/CB .
The proof of this proposition can me obtained by the direct
substitution of static strategies related to switching lines
x = xA, y = yA and x = xB , y = yB to corresponding
payoff functionals (2).
Remark 1. Values of payoff functions gA(x, y), gB(x, y)
coincide at points (xA, yB), (xB , yA)
gA(xA, yB) = gA(xB , yA) = wA,
gB(xA, yB) = gB(xB , yA) = wB .
The point NE = (xB , yA) is the “mutually punishing”
Nash equilibrium, and the point (xA, yB) does not possess
equilibrium properties in the corresponding static game.
6. CONSTRUCTION OF DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM
Let us construct the pair of feedbacks, which consist
the Nash equilibrium. For this let us combine “positive”
feedbacks u0A, v
0





Let us choose the initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]
and accuracy parameter ε > 0. Let us choose the trajec-
tory (x0(·), y0(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U0A(·), v0B(·)), generated by
“positive” u0A = U
0




B(t, x, y, ε). Let
us choose Tε > 0 such that for t ∈ [Tε,+∞]
gA(x
0(t), y0(t)) > JD−A − ε, gB(x
0(t), y0(t)) > JD−B − ε.
Let us denote by uεA(t): [0, Tε) → [0, 1], vεB(t): [0, Tε) →
[0, 1] step-by-step implementation of strategies u0A, v
0
B such




‖(x0(t), y0(t))− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε.
From the results of the paper Kleimenov (1993) the next
proposition follows.
Lemma 2. The pair of feedbacks U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε), V 0 =
v0(t, x, y, ε), combines together “positive” feedbacks u0A,




A according to rela-
tions
U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε) =
{
uεA(t), ‖(x, y)− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε,
u0B(x, y), otherwise,
V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε) =
{
vεB(t), ‖(x, y)− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε,
v0A(x, y), otherwise
is the dynamic ε-Nash equilibrium.
Below we construct flexible “positive” feedbacks that gen-
erate trajectories (xfl(·), yfl(·)), which reduce to “bet-
ter” positions than the inflexible dynamic equilibrium







fl(·), yfl(·)) ≥ vB .
7. TWO-STEP OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEMS
For the construction of “positive” feedbacks u0A =




B (x, y) we consider in this section
the auxiliary two-step optimal control problem with dis-
counted payoff functional for the first player in the situa-
tion, when actions of the second player are most unfavor-
able. Namely, let us analyze the optimal control problem




e−λtgA(x(t), y(t)) dt. (3)
Here without loss of generality let us consider that t0 = 0,
T = Tf , and terminal moment of time Tf = Tf (x0, y0)
we determine later. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the value of the static game equals to zero, wA =
DA/CA = 0.
Let us consider the case when initial conditions (x0, y0)
of the system (1) satisfy relations x0 = xA, y0 > yA. Let
us assume that actions of the second player are mostly
unfavorable for the first player. For trajectories of the
system (1), which start from initial positions (x0, y0), these
actions v0A = v
cl
A(x, y) are determined by the relation
vclA(x, y) ≡ 0.
Optimal actions u0A = u
fl
A (x, y) of the first player accord-
ing to the payoff functional JDfA (3) in this situation can
be presented as the two-step impulse control: it equals one
from the initial time moment t0 = 0 till the moment of




A (x(t), y(t)) =
{
1, t0 ≤ t < s,
0, s ≤ t < Tf .
Here the parameter s is the optimization parameter. The
final time moment Tf is determined by the following
condition. The trajectory (x(·), y(·)) of the system (1),
which starts from the line where x(t0) = xA, returns to
this line when x(Tf ) = xA.
Let us consider two aggregates of characteristics. The first
one is described by the system of differential equations
with the value on the control parameter u = 1
ẋ(t) = −x(t) + 1, ẏ(t) = −y(t), (4)
solutions of which are determined by the Cauchy formula
x(t) = (x0 − 1)e−t + 1, y(t) = y0e−t, 0 ≤ t < s. (5)
The second aggregate of characteristics is given by the
system of differential equations with the value of the
control parameter u = 0
ẋ(t) = −x(t), ẏ(t) = −y(t), (6)
solutions of which are determined by the Cauchy formula
x(t) = x1e
−t, y(t) = y1e
−t. (7)
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games theory. Let us propose for definiteness, (this propo-
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{
1, t0 ≤ t < s,
0, s ≤ t < Tf .
Here the parameter s is the optimization parameter. The
final time moment Tf is determined by the following
condition. The trajectory (x(·), y(·)) of the system (1),
which starts from the line where x(t0) = xA, returns to
this line when x(Tf ) = xA.
Let us consider two aggregates of characteristics. The first
one is described by the system of differential equations
with the value on the control parameter u = 1
ẋ(t) = −x(t) + 1, ẏ(t) = −y(t), (4)
solutions of which are determined by the Cauchy formula
x(t) = (x0 − 1)e−t + 1, y(t) = y0e−t, 0 ≤ t < s. (5)
The second aggregate of characteristics is given by the
system of differential equations with the value of the
control parameter u = 0
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Here initial positions (x1, y1) = (x1(s), y1(s)) are deter-
mined by relations
x1 = (x0 − 1)e−s + 1, y1 = y0e−s, 0 ≤ t < p (8)
Here the final time moment p = p(s) and the final position
(x2, y2) = (x2(s), y2(s)) of the whole trajectory (x(·), y(·))
is given by formulas
x1e
−p = xA, p = p(s) = lnx1(s)/xA, x2 = xA, y2 = y1e
−p.
The optimal control problem is to find such moment of
time s and the corresponding switching point (x1, y1) =
(x1(s), y1(s)) on the trajectory (x(·), y(·)), where the inte-




e−λt(CA((x0 − 1)e−t + 1)y0e−t −








−t − α2y1(s)e−t + a22) dt. (9)
8. SOLUTION OF OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM
We obtain the solution of the two-step optimal control
problem (4)-(9), by calculating the derivative dI/ds, pre-
senting it as the function of optimal switching points
(x, y) = (x1, y1), equating this derivative to zero dI/ds = 0
and finding the equation F (x, y) = 0 for the curve, that
consist from optimal switching points (x, y).
Sufficient maximum conditions in such construction are
obtained from the fact that the integral I(s) has the
property of monotonic increase by the variable s in the
initial period, because the integrand gA(x, y) is positive,
gA(x, y) > wA = 0, in the domain x > xA, y > yA. In
the finite period the integral I(s) strictly monotonically
decreases by the variable s, because the integrand gA(x, y)
is negative, gA(x, y) < wA = 0, when x > xA, y < yA.
Let us calculate integrals I1, I2, derivatives dI1/ds, dI2/ds,
summarize derivatives dI1/ds and dI2/ds, equalize the
expression to zero, express y by x and obtain the final











To construct the final switching curve MA(λ) for the
optimal strategy of the first player in the game with the
discounted functional in the case CA > 0, we add to
the curve M1A(λ) the similar curve M
2
A(λ) in the domain,
where x ≤ yA y ≤ yA.
The curve MA(λ) divides the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] into
two parts: the upper part DuA ⊃ {(x, y) : x = xA, y > yA},
and the lower part DlA ⊃ {(x, y) : x = xA, y < yA}.




max{0,−sgn(CA)}, if (x, y) ∈ DuA,
max{0, sgn(CA)}, if (x, y) ∈ DlA,
[0, 1], if (x, y) ∈ MA(λ).
(11)
Fig. 1. Switching curves M1A(λ), M
2
A(λ).
In the case when CA < 0, curves MA(λ), M
1
A(λ) and
M2A(λ) are constructed analogously
On Fig. 1 we show switching curves M1A(λ), M
2
A(λ) for
the first player. Directions of velocities ẋ are depicted by
horizontal (left and right) arrows.
For the second player one can get similar switching curves
MB(λ) for the optimal control problem with the dis-
counted functional, corresponding to the matrix B.
Remark 2. Let us note that in papers by V. I. Arnold






gA(x(t), y(t)) dt. (12)
In the paper (see Krasovskii and Tarasyev (2016)) switch-
ing curves for optimal control strategies of players in the
game with average integral functionals were obtained. For
example, for the first player in the case when CA > 0 the
switching curve in the domain x ≥ xA, y ≥ yA is described
by relations
y = 2α1x/(CAx+ α2). (13)
The asymptotical analysis of solutions (10) for the game
with discounted payoff functionals shows, that according
to L’Hospital’s rule, when the discount parameter λ tends
to zero, the relation for switching curves (10) of the control
strategy for the first player converges to switching curves
(13) in the game with average payoff functionals (12).
9. GUARANTEED VALUES OF PAYOFFS
Let us formulate the proposition, which confirms, that
the “positive” optimal control by the feedback principle
uflA (x, y) (11) with the switching curve MA, defined by
formulas (10), guarantee that the value of discounted
payoff functionals is more or equal than the value wA of
the static matrix game.
Theorem 1. For any initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
and for any trajectory (xfl(·), yfl(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, uflA ),
xfl(t0) = x0, y
fl(t0) = y0, t0 = 0, generated by the
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optimal control by the feedback principle uflA = u
fl
A (x, y)
there exists the final moment of time t∗ ∈ [0, TA] such
that in this moment of time the trajectory (xfl(·), yfl(·))
reaches the line where x = xA, namely x
fl(t∗) = xA. Then,
according to the construction of the optimal control, that
maximizes the integral (9) by the feedback principle uflA ,
the following estimate holds ∀T ≥ t∗
T∫
t∗















fl(t), yfl(t)) dt ≥ wA. (15)
Inequalities (14), (15) mean, that the value of the dis-
counted functional is not worse, than the value wA of the
static matrix game.
The analogous result is fair for trajectories, which gener-
ated by the optimal control vflB , that corresponds to the
switching curve MB .
Proof. The result of the theorem follows from the fact
that the value of the payoff functional (3) is maximum on
the constructed broken line. In particular, it is more or
equal, than the value of this functional on the trajectory
which stays on the segment x = xA with the control











These arguments imply the required relation (14), which
in the limit transition provides the relation (15). 
Remark 3. Let us consider the acceptable trajectory
(xflAB(·), y
fl
AB(·)), generated by “positive” feedbacks u
fl
A ,
vflB . Then according to the Theorem 1, the inequalities
for payoffs of both players analogous to relation (15) take
place. Hence, the acceptable trajectory (xflAB(·), y
fl
AB(·))
provides the better result for both players, than trajec-
tories, convergent to points of the static Nash equilibrium,
in which payoffs are equal to values wA and wB .
10. EQUILIBRIUM TRAJECTORIES
Let us consider payoff matrices of players on the financial
market, which reflect the data of investigated markets of
stocks and bonds in the USA. The matrix A corresponds
to the behavior of traders, which play on increase of the
course and are called “bulls”. The matrix B corresponds to
the behavior of traders, which play on the depreciation of
the course and are called “bears”. Parameters of matrices
represent rate of return for stocks and bonds, expressed in












Fig. 2. The equilibrium trajectory in the dynamic game.
Characteristic parameters of static games are given at the
following levels (see Vorobyev (1985)):
CA = 11.25, α1 = 3, α2 = 1.25,
xA = α2/CA = 0.11, yA = α1/CA = 0.27;
CB = −17.5, β1 = −2.5, β2 = −9.5,
xB = β2/CB = 0.54, yB = β1/CB = 0.14.
Let us note, that players of the coalition of “bulls” gain
in the case of upward trend of markets, when players of
both coalitions invest in the same market. And players of
the coalition of “bears” make profit from investments in
the case of downward trend of markets when players of
the coalition of “bulls” move their investments from one
market to another.
For the game of coalitions of “bulls” and “bears” we
construct switching curves MA(λ), MB(λ) and provide
calculations of equilibrium trajectories of the market dy-
namics with the value of the discount parameter λ = 0.1.
This calculations are presented on Fig. 2. Here we show
saddle points NA, NB in static antagonistic games, the
point of the Nash equilibrium NE in the static bima-
trix game, switching lines for players’ controls MA(λ) =
M1A(λ)
⋃





dynamic bimatrix game with discounted payoff functionals
for matrices A, B (16). The field of velocities of players is
depicted by arrows.
The field of directions generates equilibrium trajectories,
one of which is presented on Fig. 2. This trajectory
TR(λ) = (xflAB(·), y
fl
AB(·)) starts from the initial position
IP = (0.1, 0.9) and moves along the characteristic in the
direction of the vertex (1, 1) of the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1]
with control signals u = 1, v = 1. Then it crosses the
switching line MB(λ), and the second coalition switches
the control v from 1 to 0. Then, the trajectory TR(λ)
moves in the direction of the vertex (1, 0) until it reaches
the switching lineMA(λ). Here players of the first coalition
change the control signal u from 1 to 0. After that
the movement of the trajectory is directed along the
characteristic to the the vertex (0, 0). Then the trajectory
crosses the line MB(λ), on which the sliding mode arises,
during which the switch of controls of the second coalition
occurs, and the trajectory TR(λ) converge to the point
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optimal control by the feedback principle uflA = u
fl
A (x, y)
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course and are called “bulls”. The matrix B corresponds to
the behavior of traders, which play on the depreciation of
the course and are called “bears”. Parameters of matrices
represent rate of return for stocks and bonds, expressed in












Fig. 2. The equilibrium trajectory in the dynamic game.
Characteristic parameters of static games are given at the
following levels (see Vorobyev (1985)):
CA = 11.25, α1 = 3, α2 = 1.25,
xA = α2/CA = 0.11, yA = α1/CA = 0.27;
CB = −17.5, β1 = −2.5, β2 = −9.5,
xB = β2/CB = 0.54, yB = β1/CB = 0.14.
Let us note, that players of the coalition of “bulls” gain
in the case of upward trend of markets, when players of
both coalitions invest in the same market. And players of
the coalition of “bears” make profit from investments in
the case of downward trend of markets when players of
the coalition of “bulls” move their investments from one
market to another.
For the game of coalitions of “bulls” and “bears” we
construct switching curves MA(λ), MB(λ) and provide
calculations of equilibrium trajectories of the market dy-
namics with the value of the discount parameter λ = 0.1.
This calculations are presented on Fig. 2. Here we show
saddle points NA, NB in static antagonistic games, the
point of the Nash equilibrium NE in the static bima-
trix game, switching lines for players’ controls MA(λ) =
M1A(λ)
⋃





dynamic bimatrix game with discounted payoff functionals
for matrices A, B (16). The field of velocities of players is
depicted by arrows.
The field of directions generates equilibrium trajectories,
one of which is presented on Fig. 2. This trajectory
TR(λ) = (xflAB(·), y
fl
AB(·)) starts from the initial position
IP = (0.1, 0.9) and moves along the characteristic in the
direction of the vertex (1, 1) of the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1]
with control signals u = 1, v = 1. Then it crosses the
switching line MB(λ), and the second coalition switches
the control v from 1 to 0. Then, the trajectory TR(λ)
moves in the direction of the vertex (1, 0) until it reaches
the switching lineMA(λ). Here players of the first coalition
change the control signal u from 1 to 0. After that
the movement of the trajectory is directed along the
characteristic to the the vertex (0, 0). Then the trajectory
crosses the line MB(λ), on which the sliding mode arises,
during which the switch of controls of the second coalition
occurs, and the trajectory TR(λ) converge to the point
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Fig. 3. Demand curve L of equilibrium points.
IM(λ) = MA(λ)
⋂
MB(λ) of the intersection of switching
lines MA(λ), MB(λ).
11. DEMAND FUNCTIONS
Demand functions play an important role in the research
of sensitivity of mathematical models in economics. They
determine an equilibrium value of the demand for stocks
and bonds, depending on the value of the discount pa-
rameter λ (capital borrowing price). These functions are
also necessary to study the coefficients of elasticity of
demand, the classification of assets and to determine the
macroeconomic price equilibrium.
Demand functions are constructed numerically in the
framework of the considered approach. More precisely, for
the range of values of the discount parameter λ from 0.01
to 0.1 with the step of 0.01, the control switching curves,
equilibrium trajectories, the points of their intersection
are constructed and values of payoff functionals in these
equilibrium points are calculated.
On Fig. 3 we present the curve L for the dependence
of intersection points of equilibrium trajectories (points
where the dynamic game comes to equilibrium) on the
change of the discount parameter λ. The upper point
of this curve corresponds to the value of the discount
parameter λ = 0.01, and the lower point corresponds to
the value λ = 0.1. Calculations show that with the increase
of the discount parameter λ, the stocks demand for “bulls”
and “bears” has divergent trends.







In the Table 1 we list values of payoffs gA and gB on the
dependence curve of equilibrium solutions. It shows that
the value of payoff gA measured in the interest rate has the
growing trend with respect to the discount parameter λ.
Vice versa, the value of payoff gB declines with growth of
the discount parameter λ. However, the range of variation
of interest rates is rather small and amounts to 0.01 for gA
and 0.03 for gB . It is interesting to note that all variations
are around 2.9885 for gA and 2.8045 for gB . It means that
at equilibrium interest rates of players, both “bulls” and
“bears” are approximately equal and constitute the value
of 2.9 of the interest rate, despite the fact that “bulls”
and “bears” play qualitatively different strategies on the
financial markets of stocks and bonds.
12. CONCLUSION
In the paper, equilibrium solutions for dynamic bimatrix
games with discounted integral payoffs are constructed on
the infinite time horizon. Equilibrium trajectories describ-
ing behavior of two players on financial markets are pre-
sented. Demand functions are constructed and qualitative
analysis for trends of demand curves is given.
REFERENCES
Arnold, V.I. (2002). Optimization in mean and phase
transitions in controlled dynamical systems. Functional
Analysis and Its Applications, 36–2, 1–11.
Basar, T. and Olsder, G.J. (1982). Dynamic Noncoopera-
tive Game Theory. Academic Press, London.
Klaassen, G., Kryazhimskii, A.V., and Tarasyev, A.M.
(2004). Multiequilibrium game of timing and compe-
tition of gas pipeline projects. Journal of Optimization
Theory and Applications, 120–1, 147–179.
Kleimenov, A. (1993). Nonantagonistic Positional Differ-
ential Games. Nauka, Yekaterinburg.
Kolmogorov, A.N. (1938). On analytical methods in
probability theory. Uspekhi Mat. Nauk, 5, 5–41.
Krasovskii, A.A. and Taras’ev, A.M. (2007). Dynamic
optimization of investments in the economic growth
models. Automat. Remote Control, 68–10, 1765–1777.
Krasovskii, A.N. and Krasovskii, N.N. (1995). Control
Under Lack of Information. Birkhauser, Boston etc.
Krasovskii, N.A. and Tarasyev, A.M. (2015). Decompo-
sition algorithm of searching equilibria in a dynamic
game. Automat. Remote Control, 76–10, 1865–1893.
Krasovskii, N.A. and Tarasyev, A.M. (2016). Equilibrium
trajectories in dynamical bimatrix games with average
integral payoff functionals. Mathematical Game Theory
and its Applications, 8–2, 58–90.
Krasovskii, N.N. and Subbotin, A.I. (1988). Game–
Theoretical Control Problems. Springer, New York.
Kryazhimskii, A.V. and Osipov, Y.S. (1995). On
differential–evolutionary games. Proceedings of the
Steklov Institute of Mathematics, 211, 234–261.
Kurzhanskii, A.B. (1977). Control and Observation Under
Uncertainty. Nauka, Moscow.
Petrosjan, L.A. and Zenkevich, N.A. (2015). Conditions
for sustainable cooperation. Automation and Remote
Control, 76–10, 1894–1904.
Pontryagin, L.S., Boltyanskii, V.G., Gamkrelidze, V.G.,
and Mischenko, E.F. (1962). The Mathematical Theory
of Optimal Processes. Intersci. Publishers, New York.
Subbotin, A.I. (1991). Minimax Inequalities and
Hamilton–Jacobi Equations. Nauka, Moscow.
Subbotin, A.I. and Tarasyev, A.M. (1985). Conjugate
derivatives of the value function of a differetnial game.
Doklady AN SSSR, 283–3, 559–564.
Vorobyev, N.N. (1985). Game Theory for Economists and
System Scientists. Nauka, Moscow.
IFAC CAO 2018
Yekaterinburg, Russia, October 15-19, 2018
276
